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WORKING WITH THE NEW CIVIL CODE PROPERTY SCHEME:
THE 1982 BOOK III REVISION
The original provisions of title XXIII of the Louisiana Civil Code
of 1870 are verbose, unclear, and antiquated. Act 187 of 19821 is a
substantial revision of the codal provisions governing occupancy,'
possession, and prescription. The revision streamlines book III by
dividing title XXIII into two chapters, one on occupancy and the other
on possession, and by dividing title XXIV into four chapters, each
of which governs a particular aspect of prescription.' In terms of
language, organization, and legislative technique, the revision is a great
step forward from the obscure and poorly organized provisions of the
1870 Code. In terms of substance the revision is also quite successful
in restoring the much needed certainty and clarity in the law and
in promoting security of titles. However, the revision also introduces
some unwelcome and unnecessary confusion. This note reviews the
revision, focusing on clarifications and changes in the property law
scheme.
Changes in the Law
Error of Law
Article 1846(3 of the Civil Code of 1870' is repealed. Under prior
jurisprudence, a possessor whose belief in his ownership was mistaken
because of his error of law5 was said to be in legal bad faith, despite
his subjective good faith.' Such a possessor obviously could not utilize
Copyright 1983, by LOUISIANA LAW REVIEW.
1. Effective January 1, 1983.
2. The occupancy provisions, Louisiana Civil Code articles 3412-3420 (revised 1982),
will be discussed only to the extent that they relate to the possession and prescrip-
tion provisions. All subsequent Civil Code citations in both notes and text refer to
the newly revised and current provisions, unless otherwise specified.
3. The provisions governing liberative prescription, articles 3528-3555 of the Loui-
siana Civil Code of 1870, have not been revised and comprise chapter 4. Article 3556
also has not been revised, but it is redesignated as title XXV.
4. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1846(3) (repealed 1982) provides:
Error in law, as well as error in fact, invalidates a contract, where such error
is its only or principal cause, subject to the following modifications and restrictions.
3. Error of law can never be alleged as the means of acquiring, though it
may be invoked as the means of preventing loss or of recovering what has been
given or paid under such error. The error, under which a possessor may be as
to the legality [illegality] of his title, shall not give him a right to prescribe under it.
5. LA. CIV. CODE art. 1822 provides: "He is under error of law, who is truly in-
formed of the existence of facts, but who draws from them erroneous conclusions of law."
6. See, e.g., Dinwiddie v. Cox, 9 So. 2d 68 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1942). The court held
that a vendee was in legal bad faith because he assumed that his vendor, who was
the sole surviving child of the deceased owner of the land, was the sole heir, without
considering whether any of the predeceased children of the deceased owner had left
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the short-term acquisitive prescription, for which good faith was a
requisite. The application of the concept of error of law to acquisitive
prescription was arguably inconsistent with traditional civilian theory'
and had been the object of extensive doctrinal criticism:
The ten-year prescription is designed to protect from eviction one
who has possessed an immovable for ten years and who for just
reason believed at the time of the commencement of possession
that he was the master of the thing possessed. The prescription
is also designed to quiet titles and keep property in commerce.
Both purposes are defeated by the distinction between moral and
legal good faith [created by the jurisprudential application of arti-
cle 1846(3) of the Civil Code of 1870 to acquisitive prescription].'
In its proper realm of conventional obligations law, article 1846(3)
simply meant "that a vendee [could] not prescribe against his vendor
when there [was] a vice in the contract of transfer between them and
when the vendee should have been able to determine the vice from
the facts he knew at the time of the transaction."9 The jurispruden-
tial application of the provision to the articles governing acquisitive
prescription resulted in the exclusion of short-term prescription as
to parties possessing under error of law. The repeal remedies the
problem of application of the provision to property law, while affect-
ing obligations law minimally. Because the action for rescission of
agreements of transfer prescribes in ten years,"° the repeal does not
worsen the position of the vendor of an immovable. Although the
vendee now can perfect his title in ten years through acquisitive
prescription if otherwise in good faith, the vendor, even before the
repeal, could not object to the transfer after ten years and, conse-
quently, could not prevent the vendee from acquisitively prescribing
in thirty years. The repeal does worsen the position of the vendor
of a movable, in that the vendee otherwise in good faith now will
descendants. His error of law was his conclusion that only those children of the deceased
who were alive at the time of his death could be forced heirs.
7. "But an acquirer who made an erroneous judgment about the value of the
documents produced by his grantor could rely on this error in justifying his good
faith, even if he committed an error of law." 2 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, DROIT CIVIL FRAN-
CAIS S 218 (7th ed. Esmein 1961) in J. MAYDA, 2 CIVIL LAW TRANSLATIONS 364 (1966)
(footnotes omitted). See also 1 M. PLANIOL, TREATISE ON THE CIVIL LAW pt. 2, no. 2667
at 580 (12th ed. La. St. L. Inst. trans. 1959).
8. Note, Good Faith for Purposes of Acquisitive Prescription in Louisiana and
France, 28 LA. L. REV. 662, 671 (1968). See also Hargrave, The Work of the Louisiana
Appellate Courts for the 1973-1974 Term-Prescription, 35 LA. L. REV. 329, 331 (1975);
Comment, The Ten-Year Acquisitive Prescription of Immovables, 36 LA. L. REV. 1000,
1004 (1976).
9. Note, supra note 8, at 667-68.
10. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2221.
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acquisitively prescribe in three years," effectively reducing the ven-
dor's time to object to the transfer from ten years to three years. 2
The intent behind the repeal of the article is to overrule "legislatively
the doctrine of legal bad faith,1 3 which is consistent with the drafters'
effort to provide a predominantly objective test for the presence of
good faith."' One problem created by the repeal is determining just
how far the legislature intended to go. The doctrine of legal bad faith
is not limited to the constructive bad faith which, before the repeal,
arose from error of law. Because the doctrine is largely jurispruden-
tial, its components are not readily ascertainable, but legal bad faith
arguably can include all cases where bad faith is imputed by law to
the possessor despite his subjective good faith. The legislature clear-
ly did not intend to overrule the doctrine of legal bad faith to that
extent, as evidenced by the highly objective test for the presence
of good faith. The confusion is increased by the citation to Martin
v. Schwing Lumber & Shingle Co." in article 3481, comment (c), where
the repeal is discussed. The case is cited for the proposition that "er-
ror of law defeats good faith," placing "the acquirer of an immovable
. . . in legal bad faith," but, in fact, the holding in Schwing Lumber
was unrelated to error of law, turning instead on principles of the
public records doctrine and agency law.'6 That the drafters did not
11. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3490.
12. The repeal should be seen as the manifestation of a policy protecting good
faith transferees at the expense of true owners, at least to the extent that the repeal
worsens the position of the vendor of movables. The wisdom of this policy is more
thoroughly considered in the text, infra, notes 32-45 in the discussion of the three-
year acquisitive prescription of movables.
13. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3481, comment (c).
14. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3480 provides: "For purposes of acquisitive prescription,
a possessor is in good faith when he reasonably believes, in light of objective considera-
tions, that he is owner of the thing he possesses." (emphasis added). LA. Civ. CODE
art. 3481 provides: "Good faith is presumed. Neither error of fact nor error of law
defeats this presumption. This presumption is rebutted on proof that the possessor
knows, or should know, that he is not owner of the thing he possesses." (emphasis added).
15. 228 La. 175, 81 So. 2d 852 (1955) (This case involved an action for partition
in kind of certain land, plaintiff and defendant having each obtained an undivided one-
half interest therein. Defendant claimed ownership of the entire tract by virtue of
good faith acquisitive prescription, but the court rejected this claim, holding that defen-
dant was held to the knowledge of plaintiffs recorded interest because defendant's
agents had conducted a title search before defendant entered into possession. Defen-
dant was held to be in legal bad faith. The real issue was whether defendant was
bound by what the public records revealed, its attorneys having conducted a title ex-
amination but not having informed defendant of any defects. The court held under
rules of agency law that defendant was so bound.)
16. The court stated the rule that if "instead of relying on the faith of his vendor's
title, [the vendee] institutes an investigation into its validity, he is then bound by
what the record reveals and cannot claim to be in good faith if the record discloses
a defect in the title of his vendor." 228 La. at 182-83, 81 So. 2d at 854 (footnotes omit-
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intend to modify the traditional operation of the public records doc-
trine is stated in comment (d) to article 3480.17 This comment should
apply with equal force to article 3480's companion provision, article
3481. Concerns over the legislative intent regarding any aspects of
the doctrine of legal bad faith not discussed herein should be settled
by a textual analysis of article 3481,18 which specifies only error of
law. Because the comments are not legally binding,'9 the text of the
article should authoritatively resolve any confusion.
Just Title for Acquisitive Prescription of Immovables
Just title is one of the requisites for the ten-year acquisitive
prescription of an immovable. Under the old law, just title was
"necessarily a defective title, but one which [purported] to transfer
ownership and which [appeared] on its face to be good."2 Additional-
ly, the title had to be "valid in point of form" and "certain" in its
description of the property.2 One problem under the old law was the
confusing merger of the concepts of good faith and just title. Article
3484 (repealed 1982) described just title as "a title which the possessor
.. .received from any person whom he honestly believed to be the
real owner.12  Article 3483" clarifies the law on this point by simply
describing the attributes of just title without reference to the
possessor's beliefs regarding his title. Article 3483 further changes
the law by requiring that title be written 4 and "filed for registry in
the conveyance records of the parish in which the immovable is
ted). As to the public records doctrine generally, see the leading Louisiana case in
this area, McDuffie v. Walker, 125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
17. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3480, comment (d) states: "This provision does not affect
the public records doctrine."
18. See note 14, supra.
19. 1982 La. Acts, No. 187, S 6 provides that the "Expos6 des motif, the article
headnotes, and the comments in this Act are not part of the law and are not enacted
into law by virtue of their inclusion in this Act."
20. Dainow, Civil Code and Related Subjects-Prescription, 22 LA. L. REV. 326, 328
(1962) (footnotes omitted). See LA. CiV. CODE arts. 3483-3485 (repealed 1982).
21. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3486 (repealed 1982).
22. Emphasis added.
23. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3483 provides: "A just title is a juridical act, such as a
sale, exchange, or donation, sufficient to transfer ownership or another real right. The
act must be written, valid in form, and filed for registry in the conveyance records
of the parish in which the immovable is situated."
24. The new requirement of written title is more in the nature of a de jare change
than a defacto change. Because an unwritten title to an immovable is null unless the
parties thereto judicially confess its existence, there are few instances of titles which
are not written. See Civil Code article 2440 as to the requirement that the sale of
an immovable be in writing unless the verbal sale is judicially confessed. See also Le-
moine v. Lacour, 213 La. 109, 34 So. 2d 392 (1948).
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situated."25 The drafters did not state the policy reasons for the
change, but the greater certainty rendered by the new approach is
clearly the basis for the change. The possessor's claim to ownership
is made a part of the public record, greatly enhancing the accuracy
of title examinations by enabling an examiner to determine more ful-
ly what rights affect a given tract of land. The comments repeat the
frequently stated rule that neither a judgment nor an act of partition
can be a just title, because each purports merely to be declarative
rather than translative of rights." Arguably, however, an act of par-
tition is translative of ownership as between the parties to the parti-
tion, and it thus could serve as a just title as between the parties
or their assignees. Hence, if the partition was not in proportion to
each party's interest, the disputed area could be acquired by
prescription." Of course, a partition has no effect on the rights of
third parties. The deed acquired by a purchaser at a sale conducted
in conjunction with a partition by licitation is translative of owner-
ship and therefore can serve as the basis of a ten-year acquisitive
prescription.28 A universal successor has no title of his own, instead
merely continuing the possession of the deceased29 with all its faults
and virtues,"0 but a particular legacy can be sufficiently translative
of ownership to constitute just title.2 1 Article 3483 and its comments
present a problem in the interpretation of the legislative intent em-
bodied therein. Comment (d) states that prescription "commences to
run from the date of filing [of title] for registry rather than from the
date of entry into possession." The intended meaning of the comment
is uncertain, as illustrated by the following three hypothetical situa-
tions: (1) a party enters into possession and later records his title,
(2) a party records his title and later enters into possession, and (3)
25. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3483.
26. LA. CIV. CODE. art. 3483, comment (b). See Little v. Barbe, 195 La. 1071, 198
So. 368 (1940); Tyson v. Spearman, 190 La. 871, 183 So. 201 (1938).
27. The act of partition should be seen as translative of rights because it is in
the nature of an exchange, each co-owner giving his undivided interest in a distinct
portion of the commonly owned property in exchange for the other co-owners' un-
divided interest in another distinct portion of the property. LA. CIv. CODE art. 2660
provides: "Exchange is a contract, by which the parties to the contract give to one
another, one thing for another, whatever it be, except money; for in that case it would
be a sale."
28. See Pitre v. Peltier, 122 So. 2d 867 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1960).
29. See LA. CIv. CODE art. 3556(28); Griffon v. Blanc, 12 La. Ann. 5 (1857).
30. See G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE ET A. TISSIER, PRESCRIPTION as contained in 28
G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, TRAITE THEORIQUE ET PRATIQUE DE DROIT CIVIL S 658 (4th ed.
1924), in J. MAYDA, 5 CIVIL LAw TRANSLATIONS 330 (1972); Comment, Tacking of Posses-
sion for Acquisitive Prescription, 8 LA. L. REV. 105, 107 (1947).
31. See, e.g., Hibbert v. Mudd, 272 So. 2d 697 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972), rev'd on
other grounds, 294 So. 2d 518 (La. 1974).
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a party acquires and records his title while the true owner remains
in possession but, nine years later, usurps the owner's possession and
himself maintains possession for one year. The third hypothetical is
a preposterous but logical extension of the second; however, given
the provision in article 3475 that "possession of ten years" is required
for the ten-year acquisitive prescription of immovables, it safely can
be assumed that the comment was not intended to permit parties to
prescribe with less than ten years of possession by the simple act
of recording title. The first hypothetical presents the less unthinkable
possibility that the comment is intended to mean that the ten-year
period of possession runs from the date of recordation as a matter
of law, despite an earlier entrance into possession. Such a require-
ment is a logical consequence of article 3483 and conforms fully with
the revision policy of enhancing certainty in immovable property law,
but the drafters appear to be using the comments as a vehicle for
making law in that the requirement is a substantial change in the
law which does not necessarily follow from the text of the article.
Article 3483 may require a recordation of title that is reasonably con-
temporaneous with the entrance into possession or, less likely, it may
require no more than recordation at any time before the prescriptive
right accrues. If, under the article, just title by definition is a recorded
title, the comment is superfluous. A litigant would not be abusing
plausibility by suggesting that the inclusion of the matter in a non-
binding comment, rather than in the text of the provision, is itself
a reflection of legislative intent that it not be law. Regrettably, resolu-
tion of the problem must be left to authoritative judicial interpreta-
tion or subsequent legislation.
Three-Year Acquisitive Prescription of Movables
Article 3490 specifies the requirements for good faith acquisitive
prescription of movables and makes no changes from the old law as
to these requirements. The possessor must possess the "movable as
owner, in good faith, under an act sufficient to transfer ownership,
and without interruption for three years." 2 Comment (b) states that
the requirement of just title under the article is easily satisfied in
that there "is no requirement that the title be written or recorded,"
which is not surprising given the general lack of laws requiring that
acts affecting movables be in writing and recorded. Perhaps more
suprising is what the article accomplishes by its silence. The old law
treated acquisitive prescription of movables with much the same
language as that used in article 3490, but it did not permit the
32. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3490. Compare with note 33, infra, as to the requirements
for short-term acquisitive prescription under the old law.
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possessor to prescribe in three years if "the thing was stolen or lost.""
The drafters are content with speculation as to the policy behind the
change, as evidenced by their complete silence on the subject in the
comments. The policy underlying the change probably is one which
protects good faith possession at the expense of true ownership: under
article 3490, the good faith possessor with just title acquires even
a lost or stolen thing in three years, rather than the ten years required
under'the old law.' A very similar policy was embodied in Civil Code
article 520 (repealed 1981),"s which was proposed by the Louisiana Law
Institute and passed by the legislature as part of the 1980 book II
property law revision." The provision differed from article 3490 only
in that it favored the good faith transferee for value over the true
owner and resulted in an immediate transfer of ownership. Article
520 became the subject of controversy almost immediately after its
passage, resulting in its suspension in 198011 and its repeal in 1981.38
To the extent that the repeal reflects a legislative change of intent,
the wisdom of proposing article 3490 with such a paucity of explana-
tion is questionable.
Assuming the continued vitality of article 3490 as it now reads,
it becomes necessary to examine its role in the overall codal scheme
governing lost or stolen things. Article 521 of the Louisiana Civil
Code 39 prohibits the transfer of ownership of a lost or stolen thing
by one in possession of the thing. The article provides that for its
purposes, a "thing is stolen when one has taken possession of it
without the consent of its owner" and "a thing is not stolen when
the owner delivers it or transfers its ownership to another as a result
33. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3506 (repealed 1982), the full text of which is as follows:
"If a person has possessed in good faith and by a just title, as owner, a movable thing,
during three successive years without interruption, he shall acquire the ownership
of it by prescription unless the thing was stolen or lost."
34. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3509 (repealed 1982) provides: "When the possessor of any
movable whatever has possessed it for ten years without interruption, he shall acquire
the ownership of it without being obliged to produce a title or to prove that he did
not act in bad faith." (emphasis added).
35. LA. CIV. CODE art. 520 (repealed by 1981 La. Acts, No. 125, S 1) provides:
"A transferee in good faith for fair value acquires the ownership of a corporeal movable,
if the transferor, though not owner, has possession with the consent of the owner,
as pledgee, lessee, depositary, or other person of similar standing."
36. 1979 La. Acts, No. 180, S 1 (effective Jan. 1, 1980).
37. La. S. Con. Res. No. 172, 6th Reg. Sess. (1980).
38. See note 35, supra.
39. LA. CIV. CODE art. 521 provides:
One who has possession of a lost or stolen thing may not transfetits owner-
ship to another. For purposes of this Chapter, a thing is stolen when one has
taken possession of it without the consent of its owner. A thing is not stolen
when the owner delivers it or transfers its ownership to another as a result of
fraud.
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of fraud." When reading this provision together with the now repealed
article 520, it becomes apparent that article 521 is intended to apply
only to the thief: the possessor could transfer the ownership of the thing
to a party in good faith for fair value if he gained possession with the
owner's consent (before the repeal of article 520) or if he gained posses-
sion of the thing by inducing the owner's consent through fraud, but the
possessor could not and still cannot transfer the ownership of the thing
if he stole it. The thief, however, can transfer the possession of the
thing, and if the act of transfer sufficiently purports to transfer owner-
ship (so as to constitute just title) and the transferee is in good faith,
the transferee will acquire the ownership of the thing by prescrip-
tion in three years if he otherwise meets the requisites of article 3490.
If the thing has been lost rather than stolen, the possessor gains
ownership in three years through occupancy, 4 provided he has made
a "diligent effort"41 to find the rightful owner or possessor. Any bad
faith possessor of a lost or stolen movable, including a thief, will
acquire ownership through prescription after ten years of uninter-
rupted possession as owner. 2 The true owner may revindicate his
ownership at any time before the possessor acquires ownership, 3 sub-
ject to an obligation to reimburse the purchase price when the
possessor bought the lost or stolen movable in good faith at a public
auction or from a merchant who customarily sells similar things.4 ' The
40. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3419 provides: "One who finds a corporeal movable that
has been lost is bound to make a diligent effort to locate its owner or possessor and
to return the thing to him. If a diligent effort is made and the owner is not found
within three years, the finder acquires ownership."
41. Civil Code article 3419, comment (d) states that a "diligent effort to locate
the owner may involve publishing or advertising in newspapers, posting notes, or noti-
fying public authorities."
42. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3491 provides: "One who has possessed a movable as owner
for ten years acquires ownership by prescription. Neither title nor good faith is re-
quired for this prescription."
43. LA. CIv. CODE art. 526 provides: "The owner of a thing is entitled to recover
it from anyone who possesses or detains it without right and to obtain judgment
recognizing his ownership and ordering delivery of the thing to him."
44. LA. CIV. CODE art. 524 provides:
The owner of a lost or stolen movable may recover it from a possessor who
bought it in good faith at a public auction or from a merchant customarily selling
similar things on reimbursing the purchase price.
The former owner of a lost, stolen, or abandoned movable that has been sold
by authority of law may not recover it from the purchaser.
The owner's right to revindicate the movable and his obligation to reimburse will last
for only three years if the purchaser under the first paragraph maintains uninter-
rupted possession that long, because such a purchaser clearly would meet the re-
quirements for short-term acquisitive prescription as provided by article 3490. Under
the old law, the owner would have ten years, because the purchaser could not acquire
ownership by prescription in three years. See supra notes 33 & 34, and accompanying text.
text.
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revindicatory right is lost as to movables sold by authority of law. 5
Presumption of Intent to Retain Possession
Article 3432' 8 provides a rebuttable presumption that a possessor
intends to retain possession. Under the old law, the presumption was
rebutted by the possessor's failure "to exercise an actual possession
for ten years."4 However, as noted in comment (c) to article 3432,
this rule was not applied in the jurisprudence when the possession
was by virtue of title,48 and courts frequently avoided its application
by finding an actual possession. 4'9 The revision changes the law by
eliminating this rule. Rebuttal of the presumption that a possessor
intends to retain possession now depends on "clear proof of a con-
trary intention."'  The change addresses the problem that property
might enter a state of passive abandonment, that is, abandonment
through inaction. In solving the problem, possession has been elevated
to a right of much greater significance, now resembling ownership
in that it cannot be lost by nonuse 1 Under the revision, the presump-
tion "continues as long as possession has not been lost to another," 2
45. See the second paragraph of article 524, note 44, supra. Under article 525,
articles 518-524 do not apply to movables required by law to be registered in the
public records. For a thorough discussion of the interplay between articles 518-525
before article 520 was repealed, see Comment, Transfer of Movables by a Non-Owner,
55 TUL. L. REV. 145 (1980).
46. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3432 provides: "The intent to retain possession is presumed
unless there is clear proof of a contrary intention."
47. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3444 (repealed 1982) provides:
To retain the possession of a thing when a man once has it, it is not even
necessary that he should have such positive intention; a negative intention suf-
fices, that is, it suffices that the positive intention, which he had in acquiring
the possession, shall not have been revoked by a contrary intention; for, so long
as this revocation does not take place, the possessor is supposed always to retain
his first intention, unless a third person has usurped or taken from him the posses-
sion, or he has failed to exercise an actual possession for ten years.
(emphasis added).
48. See Manson Realty Co. v. Plaisance, 196 So. 2d 555 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1967).
49. See, e.g., Womack v. Walsh, 255 La. 217, 230 So. 2d 83 (1969) (defendant's claim
in the possessory action that plaintiffs' possession had been interrupted by a lack of
actual possession for over ten years was rejected by the court, which held that the
existence of a fence around the disputed tract, a clearing of underbrush by a bulldozer
from a portion of the tract, the planting and regular mowing of grass on that portion,
and the filling in of a well thereon together satisfied the requirements of article 3444).
50. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3432.
51. LA. CIV. CODE art. 481 provides in pertinent part: "Ownership exists in-
dependently of any exercise of it and may not be lost by nonuse." For an additional
illustration of the enhancement of possession rendered by the revision, see the discus-
sion of the three-year acquisitive prescription of movables, in text at notes 32-45, supra.
52. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3432, comment (c).
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thereby eliminating the problem of determining how long ago a
possessor's inaction began and if more recent acts are sufficient to
constitute a subsequent "actual possession." Thus, one consequence
of the change is that possession can be more easily established by
the possessor and identified by other interested parties. Possession
is lost to another under article 3433 by the possessor's manifestation
of an intent to abandon possession' or by an eviction of the possessor
by another by force or usurpation. Possession also may be transferred
to another through tacking, but the transfer is considered to be a
continuation of the transferor's possession rather than a loss of his
possession to the transferee."
Possessory Action
Prior Louisiana law had adopted the position that a "plaintiff in
a possessory action [is] one who [possesses] for himself. '55 A precarious
possessor was consequently prevented from independently seeking this
remedy for a disturbance of his precarious possession, because by
definition, a precarious possessor was one who possessed for another.5
The problem with the old approach was that it left the precarious
possessor without this highly effective remedy for disturbances unless
53. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3433, comment (c) states that what "constitutes abandon-
ment is a question to be determined in the light of all the circumstances. Abandon-
ment is predicated on a manifestation of intent to abandon, which may be established
in the light of objective criteria." Although at first glance this approach may appear
to allow the old problems (relating to inaction) to reenter through the side door, as
inaction itself may manifest an intent to abandon, the revision requires more than
the old law did. The presumption now stands absent an eviction or an objectively
cognizable manifestation of the possessor's intent to abandon possession. For cases ad-
judicating the issue of inaction as a manifestation of intent to abandon possession,
see Norton v. Addie, 337 So. 2d 432 (La. 1976) (In this possessory action, defendant
claimed that plaintiff had manifested an intent to abandon possession. The claim was
based on plaintiff's unwillingness to cut timber in the disputed tract and defendant's
testimony that plaintiff, in conversation, had disclaimed any right in the tract or in-
tent to possess it. The court rejected defendant's contention, holding that plaintiffs
unwillingness to cut timber merely manifested his uncertainty as to the status of the
property and that plaintiffs exercise of exclusive grazing privileges on the tract and
maintenance of enclosures argued against an intent to abandon.); Coyle v. Burton, 3
La. App. 34 (2d Cir. 1925) (Plaintiffs' author in title, upon discovering that her title
had allowed her more land than she was apparently entitled to under the public records,
allowed the original fence evidencing the mistaken land boundaries to deteriorate and
built a new fence on the proper line. The author in title then made no objections
to the neighbor's acts of possession up to the new fence. The court held that these
actions manifested her intent to abandon possession.)
54. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3442.
55. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3656.
56. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437\.provides: "The exercise of possession over a thing
with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or possessor is precarious possession."
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the party for whom he possessed could be convinced to bring the
action." Civil Code article 3440 changes the law by allowing the
precarious possessor to bring the possessory action against anyone
but the party for whom he possesses.' The judgment in such an action
"is not res judicata vis-a-vis the person for whom he possesses, unless
the latter has been made a party to the proceedings."59 This change
brings Louisiana into accord with other civil law jurisdictions."0
Renunciation of Prescription
Renunciation of prescription is a unilateral act which does not
require acceptance to be effective.6' Renunciation is possible only after
prescription has accrued," and, as stated in comment (c) to article 3449,
"[ilt is to be distinguished from an acknowledgement of a right or obliga-
tion, which is made prior to the accrual of prescription and which
wipes out the time that has run prior to the acknowledgement." Arti-
cle 3450 recognizes both tacit and express renunciation, but as to im-
movables, it changes the law by requiring that a renunciation of
acquisitive prescription "be express and in writing."6 The provision
57. This statement is true in theory, but it was somewhat less than accurate in
practice. Comment (b) to Civil Code article 3440 states that "according to certain Loui-
siana decisions, a precarious possessor [might] obtain injunctive relief against trespassers
or other persons who [disturbed] his possession by application of article 3663(2) of the
Louisiana Code of Civil Procedure." See Indian Bayou Hunting Club, Inc. v. Taylor,
261 So. 2d 669 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1972). However, other decisions held that the precarious
possess6r sought injunctive relief through Code of Civil Procedure art. 3601, which
imposes the burden of showing irreparable injury on plaintiff. See Caney Hunting Club,
Inc. v. Tolbert, 294 So. 2d 894 (La. App. 2d Cir. 1974).
58. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3440 provides: "Where there is a disturbance of posses-
sion, the possessory action is available to a precarious possessor, such as a lessee
or depositary, against anyone except the person for whom he possesses." Comment
(e) states that the provision in no way modifies LA. CIV. CODE art. 2704, which
provides:
If the persons by whom those acts of disturbance have been committed, pre-
tend to have a right to the thing leased, or if the lessee is cited to appear before
a court of justice to answer to the complaint of the person thus claiming the
whole or part of the thing leased, or claiming some servitude on the same, he
shall call the lessor in warranty, and shall be dismissed from the suit if he wishes
it, by naming the person under whose rights he possesses.
59. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3440, comment (d). See also LA. CiV. CODE art. 2286.
60. See A. YIANNOPOULOS, PROPERTY SS 204-206 in 2 LoUISIANA CIVIL LAw TREATISE
545 (1980).
61. See 28 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, supra note 30, S 83 at 49; M. PLANIOL, supra
note 7, no. 2712 at 601.
62. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3449.
63. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3450 provides that "rlenunciation may be express or tacit.
Tacit renunciation results from circumstances that give rise to a presumption that
the advantages of prescription have been abandoned. Nevertheless, with respect to
immovables, renunciation of acquisitive prescription must be express and in writing."
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does not expressly require recordation of such a written renuncia-
tion, but recordation does seem to be an implicit requirement. The
comment to article 3450 states that the change is made "in the in-
terest of security of titles." It is hard to imagine how security of titles
could be promoted by requiring an express and written renunciation
without recordation. The Civil Code requires recordation of all "sales,
contracts and judgements affecting immovable property"" at peril of
nullity as to third persons. The same is true of mortgages.15 The law
of registry as to immovables is so pervasive in Louisiana that recor-
dation may have been an underlying assumption by the drafters when
they required a written renunciation, but the lack of clarity on this
point will have to be resolved by the courts or the legislature. From
a purely theoretical standpoint, it certainly can be argued that because
renunciation "is a declaratory, not a translative act,"6 recordation is
unnecessary, but the argument is based on overly abstract considera-
tions and fails to recognize that although the "renunciation of a
prescription is not an alienation, it resembles it very much." 7 In fact,
the effect of a renunciation of prescription is so similar to an aliena-
tion that capacity to alienate is required. 8 These considerations, as
well as the change's stated purpose of promoting security of titles,
argue strongly for a requirement of recordation.
Even so, the very wisdom of requiring a written renunciation as
to immovables is subject to doubt. To the extent that permitting any
renunciation has the purpose of aiding true ownership (and it is hard
to imagine any other purpose), the requirement of a written renun-
ciation would seem to make it that much less likely that a party
benefitting from a prescriptive right will renounce it. Nevertheless,
the legislature has made a policy determination to promote security
of titles over ease of obtaining renunciation. The impact of this policy
is lessened by the absence of an express requirement of recordation.
Article 3451 requires a party renouncing prescription to have capacity to alienate,
and article 3453 gives parties with an interest in the acquisition of a thing or in the
extinction of a claim the right to plead prescription as to it despite the renunciation.
64. LA. CIV. CODE art. 2266. See the leading case in this area, McDuffie v. Walker,
125 La. 152, 51 So. 100 (1909).
65. See LA. CIV. CODE art. 3342.
66. 28 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, supra note 30, S 83 at 49. Baudry-Lacantinerie
and Tissier also state that renunciation "represents merely the recognition of the right
of another person. The party renouncing an acquired prescription does not alienate;
he fails to acquire .... If an immovable is involved, renunciation does not represent
an alienation which can be recorded." Id. S 82.
67. Id. S 86 at 51.
68. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3451.
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Suspension of Prescription as to Persons Lacking Capacity
Article 3468 preserves the approach under the old law of suspend-
ing prescription "against minors and interdicts unless exception is
established by legislation," even though exceptions have almost
destroyed the rule. The scheme is preserved because of provisions
present "in the Civil Code and in the Revised Statutes that may be
interpreted to suspend prescription as to minors and interdicts." 9 The
widsom of preserving the old scheme is questionable. The determina-
tions of which prescriptions are suspended have been made in
piecemeal fashion, resulting in a legal patchwork which lacks logic
and internal consistency. The controlling criteria for suspension should
be based on the particular characteristics of the various prescriptions
and the policies underlying each.
Article 3474 changes the law by establishing yet another excep-
tion: the ten-year acquisitive prescription of immovables now "runs
against absentees and incompetents, including minors and interdicts."
Under the old law, the prescription ran against minors and interdicts
but only accrued against minors one year after the attainment of the
majority. The reason for the change is stated in comment (b) to arti-
cle 3474: "minors should occupy the same position as other in-
competents." The revision makes no such change as to the three-year
or ten-year acquisitive prescription of movables;7" these prescriptions
69. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3468, comment (b). Article 3451 of the Civil Code (repealed
1982) provides that the
prescriptions mentioned in [article 3540, which governs the five-year liberative
prescription as to actions on negotiable and nonnegotiable bills and notes], those
provided in [articles 3534-3539, which govern the general liberative prescriptions
of one and three years], and those of thirty years, whether acquisitive or liberative,
shall run against minors and interdicted persons, reserving, however, recourse
against their tutors or curators. These prescriptions shall also run against per-
sons residing out of the state.
Article 763 provides that the prescription of nonuse as to servitudes runs against
minors and other incompetents, and LA. R.S. 9:5805 (1950) likewise provides that the
prescription of nonuse as to mineral servitudes (LA. MIN. CODE: LA. R.S. 31:27(1) (Supp.
1975)) runs against minors and interdicts. The five-year prescription on actions to set
aside sheriff's deeds, which is provided by La. R.S. 9:5642 (1950), is suspended for
minors and interdicts. Finally, the two-year prescription of Civil Code article 3543 is
extended to five years for minors and interdicts.
70. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3478 (repealed 1982) provides:
He who acquires an immovable in good faith and by just title prescribes for
it in ten years. This prescription shall run against interdicts, absentees and all
others now excepted by law; and as to minors this prescription shall accrue and
apply in nineteen years from the date of the birth of said minor; provided that
this prescription once it has begun to run against a party shall not be interrupted
in favor of any minor heirs of said party.
71. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3490 & 3491.
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are suspended for minors as well as interdicts. Additionally, the
general liberative prescription of ten years governed by article 3544
is still suspended as to minors and interdicts.
Conversion of Precarious Possession into Legal Possession
Precarious possession is "[tlhe exercise of possession over a thing
with the permission of or on behalf of the owner or possessor."72 Com-
ment (b) to article 3437 of the Civil Code states that by definition,
the "precarious possessor .. .does not intend to own the thing he
detains." As provided by article 3424, the intention to own the thing
possessed is one of the prerequisites for the acquisition of a true
possession. 3 When the intent is absent, the resulting precarious posses-
sion "is not simply defective possession; it excludes any concept of
possession." 4 In order for the precarious possession to be converted
into a true possession, however, it is not sufficient that the precarious
possessor merely changes his intent, because article 3438 provides
a presumption that "[a] precarious possessor, such as a lessee or
depositary, . . . [possesses] for another although he may intend to
possess for himself." The precarious possessor, therefore, must change
his intent and rebut the presumption."5 Articles 3439 and 3478"M use
72. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3437.
73. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3424 provides: "To acquire possession, one must intend
to possess as owner and must take corporeal possession of the thing."
74. 2 C. AuBRY & C. RAU, supra note 7, S 180, at 94. See also Comment, Elemen-
tary Considerations in the Commencement of Prescription on Immovable Property, 12
TUL. L. REV. 608, 616 (1938), wherein the author states that "[although a claimant
of land by the prescription of ten or thirty years may have exercised the requisite
amount of actual, physical or corporeal possession, prescription in his favor will not
commence running unless he has had the intention of possessing as owner."
75. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3438, comment (b) states that the "presumption is
rebuttable."
76. LA. CiV. CODE art. 3439:
A co-owner, or his universal successor, commences to possess for himself when
he demonstrates this intent by overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice
to his co-owner.
Any other precarious possessor, or his universal successor, commences to
possess for himself when he gives actual notice of this intent to the person on
whose behalf he is possessing.
LA. Civ. CODE art. 3478:
A co-owner, or his universal successor, may commence to prescribe when he
demonstrates by overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his co-
owner that he intends to possess the property for himself. The acquisition and
recordation of a title from a person other than a co-owner thus may mark the
commencement of prescription.
Any other precarious possessor, or his universal successor, may commence
to prescribe when he gives actual notice to the person on whose behalf he is
possessing that he intends to possess for himself.
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nearly identical wording in providing what is required to rebut the
presumption and convert the precarious possession into a true posses-
sion.
The drafters state that the provisions render no change in the
law, but it is submitted that a substantial change has been rendered.
The two articles divide precarious possessors into two classes: (1) co-
owners and their universal successors, and (2) all other precarious
possessors and their universal successors. The articles change the law77
by applying a different burden to each class for rebuttal of the
presumption of precarious possession. The co-owner is held to a stand-
ard of "overt and unambiguous acts sufficient to give notice to his
co-owner" of his changed intent, but all other precarious possessors
are held to a higher standard requiring that "actual notice" of the
changed intent be given to the person on whose behalf the precarious
possessor is possessing. The old law did not require actual notice from
any precarious possessors.7 8 Surprisingly, the drafters seem to admit
the change in an offhanded way when stating in comment (b) to arti-
cle 3478 that "Louisiana courts have interpreted [article 3512 (repealed
1982)] expansively and have held that a precarious possessor may
change the nature of his possession by his own overt and unambiguous
acts that are sufficient to give notice to the owner." Stating the stan-
dard in terms of acts sufficient to give notice to the owner indicates
an objective requirement, whereas stating the standard to be actual
notice indicates a requirement that the owner's subjective awareness
of the changed intent be established. In an attempt to determine the
legislative intent behind the language of articles 3439 and 3478, one
should proceed as the legislators did, under the premise that the pro-
visions really do not change the law. Logic supports a determination
that the apparent change in the law was not in fact rendered, because
77. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3512 (repealed 1982) provides:
Notwithstanding what is said in the two preceding articles, precarious
possessors and their heirs may prescribe when the cause of their possession is
changed by the act of a third person; as if a farmer, for example, acquires from
another the estate which he rented. For if he refuse afterwards to pay the rent,
if he declare to the lessor that he will no longer hold the estate under him, but
that he chooses to enjoy it as his own, this will be a change of possession by
an external act, which shall suffice to give a beginning to the prescription.
78. See note 77, supra. See also Thompson's Succession v. Cyprian, 34 So. 2d 285,
288 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1948) (the court held that the selling of timber by defendant
showed a change of her precarious possession by external act which was sufficient
to initiate the prescriptive period); Thomas v. Congregation of St. Sauveur Roman
Catholic Church, 308 So. 2d 337 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1975) (plaintiffs' claim of ownership
through acquisitive prescription was rejected because their ancestors, through whom
they claimed, never held themselves out to the public as owners and, consequently,
never converted the precarious nature of the possession); Dainow, Work of the Ap-
pellate Courts for the 1972-1978 Term-Prescription, 34 LA. L. REv. 274, 275 (1974).
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if differing standards for termination of precarious possession are to
be applied as between co-owners and all other precarious possessors,
it is the former that should be subjected to the heavier burden. The
co-owner who possesses the property owned in indivision does so with
the consent of the other co-owners.' As an owner, his acts hostile
to the interests of the other co-owners are less likely to incur suspi-
cion than is the case with other precarious possessors. Having accepted
arguendo the proposition that "actual notice" does not mean actual,
subjective notice, the next step is to examine the relevant cases cited
in the comments to the two provisions0 in an attempt to discover
what "actual notice" might mean to the drafters and the legislators.
Unfortunately, the cases are not helpful." The conclusion is inescapable
that the legislative intent behind articles 3439 and 3478 is that "actual
notice" means exactly what it appears to mean. A textual analysis,
considering particularly the juxtaposition of the two standards in each
article, confirms this conclusion.
Clarifications and Codifications
Quasi-Possession of Incorporeals
Civil Code article 3421 declares that "[tihe rules governing posses-
sion apply by analogy to the quasi-possession of incorporeals," codify-
ing the well-settled jurisprudence to that effect.8 While noting that
the "differentiation between possession and quasi-possession has mostly
79. Cf. Butler v. Hensley, 332 So. 2d 315 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1976) (holding that
neither co-owner is entitled to possession of the property exclusive of the other).
80. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3439, comment (b) states that according to well-settled Loui-
siana jurisprudence, "a precarious possessor commences to possess for himself when
he gives notice and manifests his intention to possess as owner by overt and unam-
biguous acts." LA. CiV. CODE art. 3478, comment (b), states that Louisiana courts in-
terpreting former article 3512 "have held that a precarious possessor may change the
nature of his possession by his own overt and unambiguous acts that are sufficient
to give notice to the owner." The two comments each cite the same three cases in
support of these very different propositions. See note 81, infra.
81. Succession of Seals, 243 La. 1056, 150 So. 2d 13 (1963) and Depuis v. Broadhurst,
213 So. 2d 528 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1968) are not helpful because both cases involve co-
owners. Thayer v. Waples, 26 La. Ann. 502 (1874), although involving a precarious
possessor who was a lessee rather than a co-owner, sheds even less light on the ques-
tion of the meaning of "actual notice." The action therein was a suit for damages brought
by a lessee in response to his ejectment from the leased premises by his lessor. The
court's only statement having even a tangential relationship to the issue at hand was
that "when a. tenant denies the title of his landlord, the relation between them is
severed and the right of entry by the landlord is complete." Id. at 503. The court
never stated that such a denial is a prerequisite to termination of precarious posses-
sion, nor should it have as the issue had no bearing on the case.
82. See Louisiana Irrigation & Mill Co. v. Pousson, 262 La. 973, 265 So. 2d 756
(1972); Parkway Dev. Corp. v. City of Shreveport, 342 So. 2d 151 (La. 1977).
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doctrinal significance,"' Professor Yiannopoulos has explained the
analogous applicability of the rules of possession to the concept of
quasi-possession as follows:
Strictly speaking, one may not have corporeal possessionof a real
right because one cannot have physical control of an incorporeal.
However, one may exercise a real right by means of material acts
or constructions. This form of exercise of a real right corresponds
to the corporeal possession of a tract of land. The intent to have
a real right as one's own after the cessation of material acts or
removal of constructions corresponds to civil possession. 4
The Code of Civil Procedure expressly accords possessory protection
to the quasi-possession of incorporeal immovables. 5
Possession and the Right to Possess
Civil Code article 3422 distinguishes between the fact of posses-
sion and the right to possess by declaring that "[p]ossession is a mat-
ter of fact; nevertheless, one who has possessed a thing for over a
year acquires the right to possess it."88 The right to possess, as
distinguished from the fact of possession, is significant for two related
reasons: (1) establishment of the right to possess is a prerequisite to
the bringing of the possessory action,87 and (2) under Civil Code arti-
cle 3434,88 once acquired, the right to possess will be maintained
83. 1 A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 60, S 211 at 565.
84. Id. See also 2 C. AUBRY & C. RAU, supra note 7, S 177 at 83. Civil possession
may not be adequate to maintain the real right because of the strong policy in Loui-
siana which disfavors dismemberments of ownership. This policy is reflected in the
revision by article 3448, which provides that "[plrescription of nonuse is a mode of
extinction of a real right other than ownership as a result of failure to exercise the
right for a period of time." On this point, see A. YIANNOPOULOS, supra note 60, S 211
at 566.
85. LA. CODE CIV. P. art. 3656 provides in pertinent part: "A plaintiff in a
possessory action shall be one who possesses for himself. A person entitled to the
use or usufruct of immovable property, and one who owns a real right therein, possesses
for himself." LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3658 provides in pertinent part: "To maintain the
possessory action the possessor must allege and prove that: (1) He had possession
of the immovable or real right therein at the time the disturbance
occurred ... "
86. For a thorough discussion of the distinction, with emphasis on the practical
consequences and historical development, see Liner v. Louisiana Land & Exploration
Co., 319 So.2d 766, 779 (1975) (Tate, J., concurring).
87. LA. CODE Civ. P. art. 3658 provides in pertinent part: "To maintain the
possessory action, the possessor must allege and prove that:... (2) He and his ancestors
in title had such possession quietly and without interruption for more than a year
immediately prior to the disturbance, unless evicted by force or fraud ....
88. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3434 provides: "The right to possess is lost upon abandon-
ment of possession. In case of eviction, the right to possess is lost if the possessor
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despite a usurpation of actual possession, unless the holder of the right
fails to recover possession within a year of the eviction. The reason-
ing behind article 3434 is obvious: after possessing adversely for over
a full year, the usurper acquires the right to possess and its atten-
dant possessory protection. An abandonment of possession89 causes
an immediate divestiture of the right under article 3434. The revi-
sion Exposg des Motifs states that "the right to possess is both
assignable and heritable."90
Possession without Title
Article 3426 provides that "[ojne who possesses a part of an im-
movable by virtue of a title is deemed to have constructive posses-
sion within the limits of his title." Comment (b) states that one "may
have constructive corporeal or constructive civil possession [and] one
may have constructive possession by virtue of a defective title."
However, article 3426 also provides that "[in the absence of title, one
has possession only of the area he actually possesses," codifying
jurisprudence to that effect." When the possessor lacks title, the court
usually will consider him to be
possessing only that part of the property over which he exercises
actual, adverse,, corporeal possession. . . . evidenced by an
enclosure of some type to definitely fix its limits, or it must be
evidenced by some external and public signs sufficient to give
notice to the public of the character and extent of the possession.'
Peremption
By virtue of four new provisions,' the Civil Code finally recognizes
the notion of peremption (forfeiture) so long recognized by Louisiana
courts.' Like liberative prescription, peremption affects rights in terms
does not recover possession within a year of the eviction. When the right to possess
is lost, possession is interrupted."
89. See note 53, supra, for jurisprudential illustrations of abandonment of
possession.
90. LA. CIv. CODE ANN. bk. III, tits. XXIII & XXIV, Expos6 des Motifs (West
Supp. 1983).
91. See Louisiana Land Co. v. Blakewood, 131 La. 539, 59 So. 984 (1912); Johnson
v. La Bokay Corp., 326 So. 2d 589 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976).
92. Johnson v. La Bokay Corp., 326 So. 2d 589, 593 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1976). Com-
ment (d) to Civil Code article 3426 states that absent title, the possessor's actual posses-
sion must be "either inch by inch possession (pedis possessio) or within enclosures.
According to well-settled Louisiana jurisprudence, an enclosure is any natural or ar-
tificial boundary."
93. LA. CIV. CODE arts. 3458-3461.
94. See cases cited in note 99, infra.
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of the passage of time.15 Most of the differences between peremption
and liberative prescription are stated in article 3461, which provides
that "[p]eremption may not be renounced, interrupted, or suspended."
Additionally, the court, on its own motion, may supply relevant
peremption provisions, even where the litigants fail to plead the issue.'
Finally, the effect of peremption is to extinguish the right entirely,97
rather than merely to bar the action. Consequently, not even a natural
obligation subsists once the peremptive period has expired.
Knowing the differences between peremption and liberative
prescription is of limited assistance in determining whether a par-
ticular statute provides for a period of peremption or a period of
liberative prescription. Comment (c) to article 3458 provides some
guidance when stating that the determination "must be made in each
case in the light of the purpose of the rule in question and in light
of whether the intent behind the rule is to bar action or to limit the
duration of a right." The best guidance is to be found both by analogy
to those cases in which the court was faced with the problem" and
in scholarly discussion. 1°° One writer discusses the problem from the
court's perspective:
Accordingly, the court has to "make" an answer for new cases,
and usually does by examining the language of the pertinent law
to see whether it seems to be an ordinary or general limitation
and subject to interruption, or whether the text indicates the crea-
tion of a right with a fixed duration of existence not subject to
any interference with the running of time, and becoming absolutely
extinct when the calendar period has elasped.' °'
95. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3458 provides: "Peremption is a period of time fixed by
law for the existence of a right. Unless timely exercised, the right is extinguished
upon the expiration of the peremptive period."
96. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3460 provides: "Peremption may be pleaded or it may be
supplied by the court on its own motion at any time prior to final judgement."
97. LA. CIV. CODE art. 3458. Comment (c) to article 3461 states that "when an
"action asserting a right subject to peremption has been commenced or served as pro-
vided in article 3462, the right has been exercised and so long as the action is pending
the lapse of the period of peremption does not extinguish the right."
98. See Dainow, The Work of the Louisiana Appellate Courts for the 1967-1968 Term-
Prescription, 29 LA. L. REv. 230 (1969).
99. See Succession of Pizzillo, 223 La. 328, 65 So. 2d 783 (1953); Collier v. Marks,
220 La. 521, 57 So. 2d 43 (1952); Brister v. Wray-Dickinson Co., 183La. 562, 164 So.
415 (1935); Guillory v. Avoyelles Ry. Co., 104 La. 11, 28 So. 899 (1900).
100. See 28 G. BAUDRY-LACANTINERIE, supra note 30, § 38 at 25; Dainow, The Work
of the Suprem Court for the 1952-1953 Term-Prescription, 14 LA. L. REV. 129 (1953);
Dainow, supra note 98, at 230; Comment, Legal Rights and the Passage of Time, 41
LA. L. REV. 220 (1980).
101. Dainow, supra note 98, at 231.
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Interruption of Prescription-Filing of Suit or Service of Process
Article 34632 clarifies the law regarding interruptions of prescrip-
tion caused by either the filing of suit in a court of competent jurisdic-
tion and venue or the service of process."3 The interruption continues
for the entire pendency of the suit." Comment (b) to article 3463 states
that the clarification is a response to some Louisiana decisions'0 5 which
had referred to a suspension of prescription during the pendency of
the suit."6 Properly speaking, it is the entire pendency of the suit
which interrupts prescription; the filing of the action or the service
of process merely marks the time at which the interruption
commences.
7
Relational Suspensions of Prescription
Article 3469 suspends prescription "as between: the spouses during
marriage, parents and children during minority, tutors and minors
during tutorship, and curators and interdicts during interdiction." Com-
ment (c) states that there "is no suspension of prescription vis-a-vis
third persons. Thus liberative prescription, acquisitive prescription,
and prescription of nonuse may accrue in favor of a third person to
102. LA. CIv. CODE art. 3463 provides:
An interruption of prescription resulting from the filing of a suit in a compe-
tent court and in the proper venue or from service of process within the prescrip-
tive period continues as long as the suit is pending. Interruption is considered
never to have occurred if the plaintiff abandons, voluntarily dismisses, or fails
to prosecute the suit at trial.
103. LA. Civ. CODE art. 3462 provides:
Prescription is interrupted when the owner commences action against the
possessor, or when the obligee commences action against the obligor, in a court
of competent jurisdiction and venue. If action is commenced in an incompetent
court, or in an improper venue, prescription is interrupted only as to a defendant
served by process within the prescriptive period.
104. The consequences of article 3463's provision for continuous interruption are
stated in comment (b):
[If] the suit is dismissed with prejudice, the interruption of prescription is im-
material because of res judicata. If the action is successful, the interruption of
prescription has produced its effect: plaintiffs right is recognized by the judg-
ment in his favor. However, if an interruption results and the action is dismissed
without prejudice, the period during which the action was pending does not count
toward the accrual of prescription. The plaintiff then has the full prescriptive
period within which to bring a new action.
105. See Hebert v. Cournoyer Oldsmobile-Cadillac-GMC, Inc., 405 So. 2d 359, 361
(La. App. 4th Cir. 1981); Marshall v. Southern Farm Bureau Casualty Co., 204 So. 2d
665, 667 (La. App. 3d Cir. 1967).
106. Compare Civil Code article 3466 (effect of interruption) with article 3472 (ef-
fect of suspension) to see the significant consequences of the distinction.
107. See Borne v. La Terre Co., 222 F.2d 453 (5th Cir. 1955); Levy v. Stelly, 277
So. 2d 194 (La. App. 4th Cir. 1973).
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the prejudice of a spouse, a minor, or an interdict." Article 3469 is
a manifestation of the policy which encourages harmony between the
members of these four special relationships. As between spouses and
as between parents and their children, the provision is made necessary,
as a matter of fairness, by procedural bars ' which prevent those par-
ties from suing each other for any but a very few enumerated causes."9
The suspensions as between tutors and minors during tutorship and
as between curators and interdicts during interdiction reflect the
legally unequal positions in which these parties stand in their
relationships. 10
Conclusion
Act 187 is a more conservative enactment than the revision pro-
posed by the Louisiana State Law Institute."' The revision, by making
a determination of what rights affect a particular thing more readily
available, prominently reflects a policy both of promoting security of
titles and of enhancing certainty in Louisiana's property law scheme.
The drafters and legislators did not use the revision as a vehicle for
effecting across the board change, which of course would have been
highly inappropriate given the need for long-term stability in prop-
erty law. There undoubtedly will be some argument that the changes
which were rendered did violate this need, but, by and large, the revi-
sion addresses the demands of a modern society with vastly improved
means of communications and transportation. A certain amount of new
108. LA. R.S. 9:291 (Supp. 1979) provides:
Unless judicially separated, spouses may not sue each other except for causes
of action arising out of a contract or the provisions of Title VI, Book III of the
Civil Code; restitution of separate property; for divorce, separation from bed and
board, and causes of action pertaining to the custody of a child or alimony for
his support while the spouses are living separate and apart, although not judicially
separated.
LA. R.S. 9:571 (Supp. 1960) provides: "The child who is not emancipated cannot sue:
(1) Either parent during the continuance of their marriage, when the parents are not
judicially separated; or (2) The parent who is entitled to his custody and control, when
the marriage of the parents is dissolved, or the parents are judicially separated."
10q. See note 108, supra, for the enumeration of causes. Only the right of action
is affected; the cause of action is preserved and may be sued upon after the relation-
ship terminates (the significance of the suspension of prescription during the relation-
ship is obvious). See Dumas v. United States Fidelity & Guar. Co., 241 La. 1096, 134
So. 2d 45 (1961; Gremillion v. Caffey, 71 So. 2d 670 (La. App. 1st Cir. 1954).
110. See LA. CIv. CODE arts. 1785, 2318, 2319.
111. One of the more innovative proposals submitted by the Louisiana State Law
Institute but rejected by the legislature would have revised Civil Code article 3471
as follows: "A juridical act purporting to exclude prescription, to specify a longer period
than that established by law, or to make the requirements of prescription more onerous,
is null. Nevertheless, a written juridical act expressly suspending the running of prescrip-
tion for a period of up to six months is valid." (emphasis added).
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confusion unfortunately has been introduced into the law. However,
Louisiana's law of occupancy, possession, and prescription is now more
concisely, coherently, and effectively stated.
Martin E. Golden
